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by Don J. Jaret
The Tax Reform Act of 19761 introduced Code section 2518,2
which attempted to create definite standards for a disclaimer to be
valid for federal tax purposes. In 1978, Congress amended section 2518
to liberalize one of the many requirements which must be satisfied for a
disclaimer to be qualified,3 and in 1981, Congress again amended sec-
tion 2518 to remove the requirement that the disclaimer be valid under
state law.4 This article will endeavor to discuss the post-1978 evolution
of section 2518 beginning with a critical analysis of the Internal Reve-
nue Service's ("IRS") interpretation of that Section as incorporated in
the proposed regulations promulgated under section 2518. In addition,
the most significant of the numerous private letter rulings issued by the
IRS interpreting section 2518 will be discussed including a review of
the effect of the 1981 amendment. In conclusion, suggestions for clari-
fying aspects of the law of disclaimers will be put forth with the hope
that the stated purpose of the law will be achieved.5
I. Disclaimers as an Estate Planning Tool
A disclaimer is the refusal to accept the ownership of property or
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2518, 90 Stat. 1893 (1976),
added I.R.C. § 2518.
2. I.R.C. § 2518 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as § 2518).
3. Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(M)(1), 92 Stat. 2935
(1978), added I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4).
4. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 426, 95 Stat. 172
(1981), added I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) [hereinafter cited as ERTA 1981].
5. For an analysis of the law prior to the enactment of section 2518 and an anal-
ysis of the effectiveness of section 2518, see Frimmer, Using Disclaimers in Post
Mortem Estate Planning: 1976 Law Leaves Unresolved Issues, 48 J. TAX'N 322
(1978); Note, I.R.C. Section 2518 and the Law of Disclaimers, 4 NoVA L.J. 187
(1980).
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rights with respect to property.' The major importance of disclaimers is
the flexibility they provide for estate planning. Disclaimers can be used
to correct errors in an estate plan after it would ordinarily be too late
(for example, after the testator's death), adjust the estate plan to ac-
count for changed circumstances, avoid the creditors of a beneficiary
and allow post mortem estate planning. The following example will
demonstrate the use of disclaimers as a method of achieving tax sav-
ings; assume each of the following disclaimers are qualified.
A disclaimer may be used to save gift tax. 7 X devises Whiteacre to
B. B has no need for Whiteacre and would prefer it to pass to his son
C. If B accepts Whiteacre and transfers it to C for less than adequate
and full consideration, B has made a taxable gift to C.8 However, if B
disclaims Whiteacre it passes to C and no gift tax will be imposed on
B9 There is no gift from B to C because B will be treated as never
having owned Whiteacre.10
A disclaimer may be used to save estate tax."1 X devises White-
acre to B who is terminally ill. B would prefer to give Whiteacre to his
son C in a manner that will not have any tax ramifications. If B ac-
cepts Whiteacre and then dies, Whiteacre will be included in B's gross
estate. 12 If B disclaims Whiteacre, it will pass to C and there will be no
6. WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT ACCOMPANYING H.R. 14844, H.R. REP.
No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WAYS AND MEANS
COMM. REPORT].
7. I.R.C. § 2518(a) (1976); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at
65.
8. I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2511 (1954); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1972), T.D. 6334,
1958-2 C.B. 643. See Hardenbergh v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 17 T.C.
338 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 26 AFTR 2d 1653 (5th Cir.
1972); Krakoff v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio af'd, 439 F.2d 1023
(6th Cir. 1971); William L. Maxwell v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952).
9. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
10. "(a) General Rule-For purposes of this subtitle, if a person makes a qualified
disclaimer with respect to any interest in property, this subtitle shall apply with respect
to such interest as if the interest had never been transferred by such person." I.R.C. §
2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
11. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
For purposes of estate tax, I.R.C. § 2046 (1976) says 2518 applies.
12. "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death." I.R.C. § 2033
(1954); Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1 (1963).
1 244 7:1983 1
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inclusion in B's gross estate because B will again be treated as never
having owned Whiteacre. 13
A disclaimer may be used to prevent an overfunding or an un-
derfunding of a marital bequest for purposes of achieving the optimal
marital deduction.14 If an amount greater than the optimal marital de-
duction 15 passes to the surviving spouse, the excess will be taxed in the
estate of the surviving spouse.18 If the surviving spouse disclaims the
excess17 over the optimal marital deduction, the disclaimed property
will not be included in the surviving spouse's gross estate.18 If an
amount less than the optimal marital deduction is provided for the sur-
viving spouse, a disclaimer by another can increase the property pass-
ing to the spouse and allow use of the full marital deduction.1 9 In much
the same way, a disclaimer by one heir can be used to increase an
estate's charitable deduction. 20 Thus, a disclaimer can be an important
post mortem estate planning tool.
A disclaimer will prevent the imposition of a generation skipping
13. Brown v. Rautzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641
(1933); I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
14. I.R.C. §§ 2518(a), 2056 (1954) (amended by 1981 ERTA); WAYS AND
MEANS CoMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65. In the following discussion it is assumed
that achieving the optimal marital deduction is desired. The optimal marital deduction
is not necessarily the maximum deduction allowable, for example, where a decedent's
adjusted gross estate is less than $425,000. For the law prior to § 2518 see generally
I.R.C. § 2056(d) (1954) (amended by 1981 ERTA) and Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-1
(1958).
15. ERTA 1981 amended § 2056 to provide for an unlimited marital deduction.
16. It will be included in the estate of the surviving spouse as an I.R.C. § 2033
inclusion because the spouse owned the property at death. If the marital bequest were
limited to the optimal amount, the excess would escape estate tax entirely.
17. The issue of partial disclaimers will be discussed later in this article as part
of an analysis of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. See text accompanying notes 58-104.
18. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
This possibility of a surviving spouse disclaiming an interest in a marital trust and
taking a portion of the disclaimed interest under a non-marital trust will be discussed
later in this article. For purposes of this example assume the property passes to the
issue of the surviving spouse.
19. I.R.C. § 2518(a).
20. Id. For an excellent discussion and example of disclaimers with respect to
charitable deductions, see Newman & Kalter, The Need For Disclaimer Legisla-
lion-An Analysis of The Background and Current Law, 28 TAx. L. 571, 577 (1975).
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tax.21 X devises to his son B a life estate in Whiteacre with remainder
to B's son C. Assuming that the value of the propety at B's death is
greater than $250,000, a generation skipping tax will be imposed at
that time.22 If B disclaims his life estate, no generation skipping tax
will be imposed because B will be treated as never having owned a life
estate in Whiteacre.23
A disclaimer may shift the income tax consequences of a trust.2 4 X
devises to B, a wealthy individual with a large income, the power to
designate who shall be the recipient of an income interest in the trust
res. The power excludes designation of the grantor's spouse.25 If B dis-
claims his power he will not be taxed on the income.2 6 Assuming B
disclaims and the income is payable to B's son C, an individual with
very little income, income tax will be saved as a result of the graduated
tax rates.
II. Legislative History
The confusion and uncertainty surrounding the common law of
disclaimers has generated considerable discussion of ways to clarify the
law.27 Many commentators and Congress suggested that the law of dis-
claimers be federalized and specific disclaimer requirements be im-
posed.28 The widespread dissatisfaction with the pre-1977 state of the
21. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
See § 2614(c) (1976); S. REP. No. 94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 607 (1976).
22. See generally I.R.C. §§ 2601-2614.
23. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 35.
I.R.C. § 2614(c) refers to § 2518 for the effect of a qualified disclaimer.
24. I.R.C. § 2518(a); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 65.
25. I.R.C. § 678(a)(1) (1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.678(a)-I (1956).
26. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(2) (1976) treats a power with respect to property as an
interest in such property. I.R.C. § 2518(a) will treat B as never having the power if he
disclaims it. In Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1954), rev'g 119 F. Supp.
360 (D.C. Pa. 1953) a widow disclaimed a portion of her interest in a trust. The court
held she was only taxable on the income of the portion she retained.
27. Newman & Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW.
827, 837 (1974); Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes, Tax Section Recommendations
No. 1974-2, 27 TAX LAW. 818 (1974).
28. Newman & Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW.
827, 837 (1974); Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes, Tax Section Recommendations
No. 1974-2, 27 TAx LAW. 818 (1974); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note
4
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law brought about the enactment of section 2518.29 A disclaimer of an
interest in property created after 1976 will be effective for federal tax
purposes only if it is a "qualified" disclaimer. Section 2518 delineates
the requirements a disclaimer must satisfy to be considered qualified.
Section 2518, as initially adopted, required that the disclaimed prop-
erty must pass to a person other than the disclaimant and that the
disclaimer be valid under local law.In 1978, Congress recognized that the requirement that the dis-
claimed property pass to someone other than the disclaimant would
create an undesirable situation where the disclaimant was a surviving
spouse and the property passed to a non-marital or marital trust as a
result of the disclaimer. Congress therefore amended section 2518 to
make it possible for property to pass to a decedent's spouse as a result
of a disclaimer even if the surviving spouse was the disclaimant.3°
In 1981, Congress, recognizing the local law still played an impor-
tant role in determining whether a disclaimer was qualified, amended
section 2518 in an attempt to make it independent of state law. Con-
gress felt that state law was not an adequate basis upon which to mea-
sure the effectiveness of a disclaimer because local disclaimer laws were
not uniform. This caused identical refusals to accept property to be
treated differently for Federal estate and gift tax purposes31
III. Proposed Regulations and Private Rulings
The IRS published proposed regulations for section 2518 on July
6, at 66.
29. Newman & Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW.
827, 837 (1974); Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes, Tax Section Recommendations
No. 1974-2, 27 TAx LAW. 818 (1974); (1974). The dissatisfaction stemmed from the
fact that prior to § 2518, disclaimers were handled under many different code sections
and in many different regulations and were dependent upon local law. See Treas. Regs.
§§ 25.2511-1(c) (1972), 20.2041-3(d)(6) (1958), 20.2056(d)-i(a)(1958).
30. Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(M), 92 Stat. 2934
(1978), amended I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) [hereinafter referred to as Tax Reform Act of
1978]; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1978 at 443 (Comm. Print 1979); WAYS AND
MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6.
31. WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, ACCOMPANYING H.R. 4242, H.R. REP.
No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1981).
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22, 1980.32 At this time, the date final regulations will be issued and
the form those regulations will take is entirely speculative."3 In addition
to the proposed regulations, the IRS has attempted to interpret the law
as it relates to specific taxpayer questions by issuing numerous private
letter rulings. 4 This portion of the article will analyze several impor-
tant provisions of the proposed regulations and several significant pri-
vate letter rulings with respect to section 2518.
A. Reliance Upon State Law
The intent of Congress in enacting section 2518 was to create a
federal standard for disclaimers, thus ending reliance upon state law in
determining the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer. 5 Therefore,
most practitioners hoped that section 2518 would provide a uniform set
of rules for determining the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer.
However, prior to the amendment of section 2518 contained in the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,81 section 2518(b)(4)(A) and (B) re-
quired that the disclaimed interest must pass to a person other than the
disclaimant or the spouse of the decedent (the decedent being the testa-
mentary transferor). The pre-1982 absence of a federal rule or regula-
tion determining who will receive the disclaimed property 7 prevented
section 2518 from acting as a safe harbor because the courts were
forced to look to local law in making the determination as to whether a
disclaimer was disqualified. Consequently, if local law did not recognize
the disclaimer, section 2518(b)(4) could not be satisfied. Therefore,
32. Prop. Reg. §§ 25.2518-1 to 4, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980)(to be codified at
26 C.F.R. § 25.2518).
33. On November 23, 1981, a final version of the regulations were delivered to
the Commissioner for final approval.
34. Rev. Proc. 80-20, 1980-1 C.B. 633.
35. "If the requirements of the provision are satisfied, a refusal to accept prop-
erty is to be given applicable effect for federal, estate and gift tax purposes even if the
local law does not technically charcterize the refusal as a 'disclaimer'. . . ." WAYS
AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 67. See also, Frimmer, supra note 5.
36. ERTA 1981 426(a). Section 2518(c)(3)(1981) applies to transfers creating
an interest in the person disclaiming made after December 31, 1981.
37. There are no federal rules or regulations which deal with who the recipient of
the property will be after the property has been disclaimed. Therefore, local law must
be consulted.
1 248
7:19831
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prior to 1982, the only way to be certain a disclaimer would be quali-
fied is to satisfy both state and federal requirements.
The proposed regulations specifically provide that a disclaimer, to
be qualified, must be valid under state law.38 Moreover, in a number of
private letter rulings, the IRS has ruled that a disclaimer not valid
under state law cannot be a qualified disclaimer under section 2518.11
Recognizing that the purpose and intent of section 2518-to cre-
ate a uniform federal standard for disclaimers-was being thwarted by
the IRS, Congress, as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
added a new section 2518(c)(3) to the Code.40 Section 2518(c)(3) pro-
vides that:
(3) Certain Transfers Treated as Disclaimers. For purposes of Sub-
section (a), a written transfer of the transferor's entire interest in
the property-
(A) which meets requirements similar to the requirements of
paragraphs (2) and (3) of Subsection (b), and
(B) which is to a person or persons who would have received
the property had the transferor made a qualified disclaimer (with
in the meaning of Subsection (b)), shall be treated as a qualified
disclaimer.41
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that a disclaimer is not valid under local
law, the recipient of property could, if the requirements of section
2518(c)(3) are satisfied, transfer property to another free of transfer
tax.
The application of section 2518(c)(3) in many situations is un-
clear. Section 2518(c)(3) makes no attempt to define requirements
which are "similar to" those contained in sections 2518(b)(2) and (3).
38. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-1(c)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. § 25.2518). The regulation provides: "If a disclaimer is not effective under
applicable local law to divest ownership of the disclaimed property in the disclaimant
and to vest it in another, the disclaimer is not a qualified disclaimer under Section
2518."
39. See I.R.S. Letter Rulings, 8148018, July 31, 1981 (involving a pre-ERTA
disclaimer), 8027016, March 27, 1980; 8022021, Feb. 26, 1980; and 7937011, May 31,
1979.
40. ERTA 1981 § 426(a) (which added § 2518(c)(3)).
41. I.R.C. § 2518 (c)(3) (1981) (emphasis added).
7:1983
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Consequently, a disclaimant will have no reliable method of determin-
ing whether he has complied with the requirements of subsection
(c)(3). For example, is a disclaimer ten months after the date on which
the interest was created qualified because a ten-month requirment is
"similar to" the nine-month requirement? Is a disclaimer which occurs
one day after a disclaimant has accepted the benefits of property quali-
fied because the short period for which the benefits were accepted is
"similar to" the requirement that none of the benefits be accepted?
Conversely, is the "similar to" requirement to be interpreted more
stringently than the normal requirements of section 2518(b)?
Another significant defect in section 2518(c)(3) is the requirement
for a written transfer of the "entire interest" in property.42 Although
unclear, that requirement seems to prohibit the disclaimer of an undi-
vided portion of an interest. This can be illustrated by the following
example. X dies intestate with Blackacre, his only asset, passing to B.
State law prohibits the disclaimer of an intestate share. B disclaims an
undivided interest in Blackacre. If state law recognized the dis-
claimer of an intestate share, B's disclaimer would be qualified insofar
as it would be the disclaimer of an undivided portion of an interest.' 3 It
appears doubtful that Congress intended to limit the interest which
may be disclaimed to the "entire interest" in property in those situa-
tions where the disclaimer is not valid under state law. Therefore, sec-
tion 2518(c)(3) should be interpreted in such a manner as to allow the
disclaimer of an undivided portion of an interest in property.4'
42. Id.
43. See Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(b) and the text accompanying notes 54-58 infra.
44. Due to the recent passage of § 2518 (c)(3), there is no indication at this time
as to how the IRS will interpret the "entire interest" requirement.
The legislative history of § 2518(c)(3) provides:
Under the Committee Bill, for purposes of the estate and gift tax, a
refusal to accept any property interest that is not effective to pass title
under local law will be considered to pass the property without any direc-
tion on the part of the disclaimant if the refusal otherwise satisfies the
Federal requirements and the disclaimant timely transfers the property in-
terest to the person who would have received the property had the refusal
been an effective disclaimer under state law. Although the State disclaimer
rules will be used to determine the transferee, the refusal need not be a
valid disclaimer under local law.
S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 142 (1981).
1250 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/2
7:1983 LR.C. Section 2518 251
The person to whom the transfer must be made is the person who
would have received the property had the transferor made a qualified
disclaimer.' 5 Presumably, that language was intended to require a
transfer by the disclaimant to the person to whom the property would
have passed had the disclaimer been valid under state law."e
B. Writing Requirement
One of the more basic and straightforward requirements of section
2518 is that the disclaimer be in writing.' 7 Section 2518, however, does
not specifiy whether the written disclaimer must be signed, or, if signa-
ture is required, who must sign. The proposed regulations specifically
provide that the disclaimer must be signed, a requirement not expressly
included in section 2518, and recognize that the legal representative of
the disclaimant may sign.4 Thus, it appears that one of the questions
not resolved by the passage of section 2518-whether a legal represen-
tative may disclaim on behalf of an individual who is incapable of dis-
claiming due to a legal incapacity of one form or another-is answered
affirmatively by the proposed regulations.
The IRS has ruled that the personal representative of a deceased
beneficiary may disclaim property passing to a-deceased beneficiary's
estate.'9 the ruling did not indicate whether the result would have been
different if the disclaimer had been made by a guardian or other form
of legal representative. Presumably the precise title attached to the
fiduciary will be considered irrelevant. The ruling did, however, empha-
size the fact that the personal representative has the power to disclaim
on behalf of the estate of the deceased beneficiary under state law.
The result where a legal representative does not have the power to
disclaim on behalf of a deceased beneficiary under state law is less
clear.50 Presumably, the 1981 amendment adding section 2518(c)(3)
45. I.R.C. § 2518 (c)(3)(B).
46. Id.
47. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(1) (1976).
48. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(b), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. § 25.2518).
49. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8146045, Aug. 19, 1981.
50. See Letter Ruling 8148018, July 31, 1981. In that ruling, the IRS held that
the disclaimer by an executor was not qualified because state law did not authorize the
9
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will allow a legal representative to disclaim on behalf of the person he
represents regardless of the validity of the disclaimer under state law.5 1
C. Jointly Owned Property
The law of disclaimers as it applies to jointly held property, in-
cluding tenancy by the entirety, has always been unclear. In a factual
situation arising prior to the enactment of section 2518, the IRS ruled
that jointly held property could not be disclaimed if the rights of each
joint tenant vested upon the creaton of the tenancy and no greater right
accrues by the death of either."2
The IRS appears to have changed its position with respect to the
disclaimer of jointly held property. The proposed regulations sanction
the disclaimer of jointly owned property if, in addition to the require-
ments contained in section 2518(b), the following requirements are
met: (i) the disclaimer must be made with respect to the entire interest
in property which is the subject of the tenancy, and (ii) the disclaimer
must be made within nine months of the creation of the tenancy.58
The requirement that the disclaimer must be made with respect to
the "entire interest" in property seems to prohibit the disclaimer of the
accretive interest created by the death of a joint tenant. For example,
where A and B own real property as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship and A dies within 9 months of the creation of the tenancy,
if B must disclaim his entire interest in the real property for his dis-
claimer to be qualified, B must not have an interest in the property
after the disclaimer. It is not clear whether B will be able to disclaim
his entire interest in the property which he holds immediately after A's
death because the IRS may take the position that B has already ac-
cepted the benefits of owning an undivided interest that property, i.e. B
has accepted the benefits of being a joint tenant prior to the death of A
upon the creation of the tenancy. A more logical interpretation of this
requirement would be to treat B as never having accepted the benefits
executor to disclaim on behalf of the decedent's estate.
51. See the discussion regarding the application of state law in text accompany-
ing notes 35-46.
52. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 7911005, Nov. 29, 1978.
53. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. § 25.2518).
7:1983 1
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of Blackacre. The Regulations should specifically provide that one's
status as a joint owner of property will not be sufficient to constitute
the acceptance of the benefits of ownership. Another consequence of
the "entire interest" requirement is that it can be interpreted to pro-
hibit the disclaimer of an undivided portion of the accretive interest
created upon the death of a joint tenant.
The requirement that the disclaimer be made within nine months
of the creation of the tenancy effectively prohibits the disclaimer of
jointly held property in almost all situations. This can be illustrated by
the following example. On January 1, 1982, A and B acquire a parcel
of real property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. On Jan-
uary 1, 1983, A dies. B, wishing to disclaim the accretive interest in the
real property passing to him as a result of A's death, files a disclaimer
with the executor of A's estate on January 2, 1983. B's disclaimer is
not qualified insofar as it was not made within nine months of the crea-
tion of the tenancy (because the tenancy was created on January 1,
1982).
The "entire interest" and "nine month" requirements for a dis-
claimer of jointly held property to be qualified are an unwarranted ex-
tension of the statute. The rules of section 2518(b) should apply to
jointly held property just as they apply to all other forms of property.
The disclaimer of the accretive interest in property should be consid-
ered qualified, and a joint tenant should not be considered as accepting
the benefits of jointly owned property by virtue of being a joint tenant.
Since the creation of a revocable joint bank account is not a taxa-
ble transfer,5 the special rules for the disclaimer of jointly held prop-
erty discussed above do not apply to revocable joint bank accounts.5
Moreover, the nine month disclaimer period does not begin to run until
the death of the donor. 6
One interesting question with respect to revocable joint bank ac-
counts is whether the donor or transferor of the property can make a
qualified disclaimer of his survivorship interest in the property on the
death of the co-tenant. For example, if H using his individual funds
creates a joint bank account with his wife, W, will H's disclaimer of
54. I.R.C. § 2511 (1954); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1972).
55. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(3).
56. I.R.S. Letter Rulings 8130069, April 29, 1981; 8124118, March 20, 1981.
11
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the bank account upon the death of W be qualified? The IRS has ruled
that it would not because "the estate and gift tax laws apply to the
disclaimed interest . . . as if the interest had never been transferred to
such person. Thus, the IRS reasoned that the qualified disclaimer
rules are not available to the donor or transferor of the property, but
are only available to the donee or transferee of the property. The ruling
is clearly correct inasmuch as it requires a "transfer" of property
before the disclaimer provisions can be activated. Since W died prior
the the occurrence of a "transfer" of property, the "transfer" require-
ment has not been satisfied.
D. Disclaimer of Less Than Entire Interest
Section 2518 allows the disclaimer with respect to "an undivided
portion of an interest." 58 The meaning of the phrase "an undivided por-
tion of an interest" is unclear. 9 Consequently, a devisee is faced with
the dilemma of whether the disclaimer of any of the following interests
will be qualified: a fractional interest in property (an undivided one
half interest), a portion of a pecuniary devise ($25,000 of a $50,000
devise), a portion of a specific devise (five acres of a ten acre tract) or a
carved out interest (a life estate or a remainder from a fee).
Prior to the publication of the proposed regulations, many com-
mentators believed that fractional and pecuniary interests in property
could be disclaimed whereas a carved out interest could not.60 The pro-
posed regulations seem to allow disclaimers of fractional interests as
well as some forms of pecuniary and carved out interests. The Regula-
tions attempt to clarify this uncertainty by formulating various highly
complex and totally arbitrary rules.61 The paragraphs which follow at-
tempt to explain and analyze these rules.
57. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8130069, April 29, 1981.
58. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(1) (1976).
59. See Frimmer, supra note 5, at 322 (1978) and Note, supra note 5, at 202.
60. See Frimmer, supra note 5, at 322 (1978) and Note, supra note 5, at 202.
61. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at
§ 26 C.F.R. § 25.2518).
254 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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Partial Interest Rule
The first rule with respect to the disclaimer of an undivided por-
tion of an interest is called "disclaimer of a partial interest. '8 2 The rule
reads as follows: "[i]f the requirements of this section are met, the dis-
claimer of an entire interest in property may be qualified disclaimer
even if the disclaimer has another interest in the same property."8 3 It is
rather curious that the above quoted sentence uses the term "entire
interest" and the section of the proposed regulations in which it ap-
pears is entitled "disclaimer of less than entire interest."" Moreover,
the subsection of the proposed regulations in which that sentence ap-
pears is entitled "[d]isclaimer of a partial interest."'8 This seems to
evidence the fact that the IRS has not adequately defined the terms
"interest", "entire interest", and "partial interest."
The specific requirements of this first rule of partial disclaimers,
although never clearly articulated in the proposed regulation, appear to
center around the divisibility or aggregation of interests in a single
piece of property. That is, whether the various interests of a disclai-
mant in a single piece of property should be aggregated and treated as
one, or should be treated as separate divisible elements of a single piece
of property. If the interests are considered divisible, the disclaimant
may disclaim one interest and retain the other; if the interests are ag-
gregated (i.e. treated as one), the disclaimant may only disclaim an
undivided portion of his interest as aggregated.
In order to apply the aggregation rules discussed above, criteria
must be established to determine whether various interests in a single
piece of property should be aggregated. The proposed regulations con-
tain two such rules.88 The first rule is that all income interests benefi-
cially owned by a person shall be treated as one interest in property,
and all beneficial interests in corpus shall be treated as one interest.
62. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. § 25.2518).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. § 25.2518).
65. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. § 25.2518).
66. Id.
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For example, if Blackacre is devised with an income interest to A for
ten years, an income interest to B for the next ten years, an income
interest to A for the ten years after that, and then an income interest to
C for ten years, remainder to A, presumably, A will be considered as
having only two, not three, interests in Blackacre. A's first interest is
the right to receive the income from Blackacre in years one through ten
and in years twenty-one through thirty; A's second interest is the re-
mainder interest. By aggregating each of A's income interests, the pro-
posed regulation would not allow A to disclaim one of his income inter-
ests while retaining the other.8 7 The proposed regulation would,
however, allow A to disclaim his income interest and retain his corpus
interest, or to retain his corpus interest and disclaim his income
interest. 68
The second rule of aggregation is that if the separate interests of
the disclaimant are considered as merged under state law, the disclai-
mant must disclaim the entire merged interest or an undivided portion
of such merged interest.6 9 Thus, if Blackacre is devised to A for life,
remainder to A, and under state law A is considered as owning Black-
acre in fee, A's disclaimer of his life estate in Blackacre will be quali-
fied only if the disclaimer of a life estate from a fee is considered the
disclaimer of an undivided interest. 0 If A's interest is not considered as
merged under state law, A's income and corpus interests will be consid-
ered separate divisible interests in Blackacre and A could make a quali-
fied disclaimer of either."
The application of the doctrine of merger in this context, when
viewed in isolation, appears reasonable. However, remembering that
the intent of section 2518 was the creation of a uniform federal stan-
67. This result seems to follow from the example in the regulations where securi-
ties are devised to A for life, then to B for life, remainder to A's estate. The regulation
state that A could disclaim his income interest, his remainder interest or an undivided
portion of either; however, the regulations specifically state that A could not disclaim a
ten year income interest from his life estate. The IRS must therefore not consider the
disclaimer of a ten year from a life interest a disclaimer of an undivided portion of an
interest. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i). But see Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d) example 4
where a disclaimant of 40% of an income interest was qualified.
68. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i), 3(d) example 8.
69. Id.
70. This issue is discussed further at text accompanying notes 95-97.
71. See Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a).
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dard for disclaimers, reliance upon state law to determine whether a
disclaimant possesses divisible interests in a single piece of property ap-
pears to be another digression thwarting the uniform application of the
statute. This can be illustrated by the following example. A devises
Blackacre to B with B having an income interest until he attains age
40, then to B or B's estate. If in state #1 B's interests in Blackacre are
not merged, B's disclaimer or his income interest and/or his remainder
interest will be qualified. In state #2, if B's interests in Blackacre are
merged, B cannot disclaim solely his income interest (or his remainder
interest) in Blackacre;72 however, B can disclaim a portion of Blackacre
if his disclaimer satisfies the undivided portion rule. 3
Possibly the most distressing provision of the proposed regulation
dealing with partial disclaimers is contained in the following sentence:
"[m]oreover, if the property is divided in a manner that would permit
the disclaimant to avoid the limitations of section 2518, the separate
interests created by the grantor are treated as one indivisible inter-
est." 7 4 The meaning of that sentence is totally unclear. If this is an IRS
attempt to include a catchall in the regulations so that any disclaimer
which it deems objectionable will be caught and treated as a taxable
transfer, that sentence will contravene the entire purpose of section
2518 and inhibit the use of a provision of the Code which Congress
intended to make available to taxpayers. If that sentence is merely in-
tended to deal with a specific fact situation contemplated by the IRS,
the IRS should address that situation in more specific terms. 75
The regulations illustrate the application of this avoidance concept
in one example. In that example, C devised 'A of his residuary estate to
D with any disclaimed property to E, 'A of his residuary estate to D
with any disclaimed property to F and 1 of his residuary estate to D
with any disclaimed property to G. The regulation concludes that D's
disclaimer of the 1A of the residuary estate which passes to E is not
qualified because C divided the property in a manner that would permit
72. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i).
73. See the discussion in text accompanying notes 95-97.
74. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i).
75. C.f. the trust rule which is discussed in text accompanying notes 86-97, i.e.
split transfer into separate trusts or make greater than one transfer so the disclaimant
can disclaim part (avoid aggregation).
257 1LR.C Section 251817:1983
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the disclaimant to avoid the limitations of section 251 8.71 It is not intu-
itively obvious why the IRS finds the facts of that example objectiona-
ble. If the remainder was devised in toto to D, D could clearly have
disclaimed an undivided / interest in the property." Moreover, D may
have been able to disclaim 33 '% of the value of the remainder. 8 In
light of D's ability to disclaim / of the property notwithstanding C's
perceived attempt to avoid the limitations of section 2518, the IRS's
only objection could be that C or D has directed the person to whom
the property is passing. If the IRS's objection to the disclaimer in the
example discussed above is the disclaimant's disposition of the dis-
claimed property, it is curious that this provision was not placed in the
section of the proposed regulations dealing with the disclaimant's direc-
tion of the property.
A more fundamental question is whether the actions taken by C
and/or D constitute a transgression of the prohibition of directing the
passage of the property. Section 2518(b)(4) clearly provides that the
person making the disclaimer may not direct the passage of the dis-
claimed property. No mention is made of any prohibition of the actions
of a person other than the disclaimant. Therefore, the actions of C, in
directing who will receive the disclaimed property is not relevant to the
qualifications of D's disclaimer.
Has D directed the pasage of the property by virtue of his dis-
claiming a portion of a homogeneous property? Arguably, if the prop-
erty is homogeneous, D has directed the property because he has been
given, in effect, the right to choose the recipient of the property he
partially disclaims among a group of three, E, F and G. Would the
result be different if C devises his home ( 1 of his estate), his business
('A of his estate) and his other assets (/ of his estate) to D with a
disclaimer of his home to E, with a disclaimer of his business to F, and
with a disclaimer of his other assets to. G? In this situation, D does not
have any right to choose among E, F or G as to who will receive the
disclaimed property. Thus, D's disclaimer of any of the three specific
devises should be qualified insofar as D's disclaimer will have true eco-
76. See Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d) example 14.
77. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(b). It may be possible under the severable property
rule or the pecuniary interest rule for D to have disclaimed 33 1h percent of the prop-
erty if it had been devised to him in total. See example 4 of Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d).
78. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d); 25.2518-3(d).
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/2
7:1983J...Scin2125
nomic significance.79
Severable Property Rule
The second rule of partial disclaimers, the "severable property
rule" is a logical application of the requirement that a disclaimer must
involve an undivided interest in property.80 That rule allows a disclai-
mant to disclaim a severable interest in property if specific reference is
made to specific items of property. Severable property is defined as
"property which can be separated from other property to which it is
joined and which after severance, maintains a complete and indepen-
dent existence.8" The proposed regulation indicates that shares of cor-
porate stock are severable property.82 Presumably, real estate will be
considered severable so that the disclaimer of five acres of a ten acre
tract wil be qualified.83
The IRS has had the opportunity to apply its definition of the term
"severable property" in two recent private letter rulings." In Letter
Ruling 8113061, the devisee of two-thirds of a residuary estate dis-
claimed his interest in the residuary estate to the extent that it ex-
ceeded a debt to the estate. The IRS, although never directly stating
that the portion of the residuary estate disclaimed by the devisee was
severable from that which he retained, discussed the severable property
rule in the paragraph immediately before the paragraph in which it
concluded the disclaimer was qualified. In Letter Ruling 8145036, the
IRS ruled that the disclaimer of a portion of a child's intestate share
would be qualified.85 The IRS's rationale again appeared to be the sev-
erable property rule. Since neither ruling made mention of the type or
79. C.f. the trust income allocation rules contained in I.R.C. § 651(b) (1954);
622(b) (1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.652(b)-2(b) (1960); the partnership allocation rules
contained in I.R.C. § 707(b)(2) (1954).
80. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(ii), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. § 25.2518).
81. Id. See I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8113061, Dec. 31, 1980, where the IRS seems
to have ruled that the remainder of an estate consists of severable property.
82. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d) example 1 contains other examples of severable
property.
83. See I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8130127, April 30, 1981.
84. See I.R.S. Letter Rulings 8113061, Dec. 31, 1980; 8130127, April 30, 1981.
85. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8145036, Aug. 11, 1981.
259 1LR.C Section 25187:1983
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nature of the property owned by the estate, it appears that these rulings
may support the proposition that a remainder interest is comprised of
severable property, and that the IRS is interpreting the severable prop-
erty rule liberally to allow the disclaimer of a specific percentage of a
residuary estate.
Trust Rule
The third rule of partial disclaimers deals with the application of
the first rule of partial disclaimers, the disclaimer of a partial interest
88
to property held in trust . 7 That is, all interests in trust income are
treated as a single interest and all interests in trust corpus are treated
as a different single interest. The proposed regulations illustrate this
rule with the following example:
A disclaimer is not a qualified disclaimer under Section 2518
if the beneficiary disclaims income derived from specific properties
transferred in trust while continuing to accept income derived from
the remaining properties in the same trust. Similarly, since all in-
terests in the corpus of a trust are treated as a single interest, in
order to. have a qualified disclaimer of an interest in corpus the
disclaimant must disclaim all such interests, either totally or as an
undivided portion. 8
The language of the above quoted example appears to create a
distinction between a partial disclaimer of an income interest in trust
property and a partial disclaimer of an interest in the corpus of a trust.
This distinction arises as a result of the omission of the qualifying lan-
guage that "the disclaimant must disclaim all such interests, either to-
tally or as an undivided portion"89 from the portion of the example
dealing with the partial disclaimer of an income interest.
The IRS's interpretation of the interrelation between the "severa-
ble property rule" and the "trust rule" creates another artificial distinc-
tion in determining whether a partial disclaimer is qualified. Although
86. See supra text accompanying notes 62-75.
87. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,922 (1980) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. § 25.2518).
88. Id.
89. Id.
Nova Law Journal
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the IRS seems to take the position that severable items of property lose
their identity as severable property when placed in trust,90 there does
not appear to be any justifiable reason for distinguishing between a
situaton where A makes a gift to B of a life interest in two paintings
followed by B's disclaimer of one life interest, and the situation where
A creates a trust with the two paintings as the corpus giving B an in-
come interest in the trust followed by B's disclaimer of the income gen-
erated by one specific painting. In the first situation, B's income inter-
ests in each painting will be considered severable property and
therefore B's disclaimer of his life estate in one of the paintings will be
qualified.91 The language of the proposed regulation seems to consider
the disclaimer in the second situation to be disqualified merely because
the property has been placed in trust.9 2 The final regulations will hope-
fully clarify this situation.
If taxable transfers to the same trust are made at different times
or by different transferors, a qualified disclaimer is permitted with re-
spect to each transfer, because each transfer will be treated as though
it were a transfer to a separate trust.93 Query: is it possible to avoid the
partial disclaimer rules as they apply to trusts by transferring property
to a trust in installments? For example, will the result in the first situa-
tion posed above be different if A transferred painting number 1 to the
trust on January 1, 1982, and transferred panting number 2 to the
trust on January 2, 1982. Would the result be different if painting
number 2 were transferred on January 1, 1983291
90. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(ii). But see Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i);
I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8212061, Dec. 24, 1981 and I.R.S. Letter Ruling 7913084, Dec.
28, 1978. In Letter Ruling 7913084, Dec. 28, 1978,-the IRS ruled that the beneficiary
of a trust may disclaim all, or a specified undivided portion (for example 1/20 of your
interest in the trust) or all your interest (principal and income) in a specified asset or
assets. .. "
91. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(ii).
92. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(2). See example 5 of Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(d).
93. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(2).
94. See Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i). Is this a situation where the IRS would
attempt to invoke that provision of the proposed regulations? On its face, that provision
appears applicable because the property has not been "divided". The IRS may take the
position that the proximity in time of the transfers require their aggregation notwith-
standing the proposed regulation.
7:1983 261 1. LR.C Section 2518
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Undivided Portion Rule
The "undivided portion rule" of partial disclaimers seems to be the
IRS's attempt to interpret the language of section 2518 which allows
the disclaimer of an undivided portion of an interest.95 The proposed
regulations define the term "undivided portion of an interest" as:
• . . a fraction or percentage of each and every substantial interest
or right owned by the disclaimant in such property and must ex-
tend over the entire term of the disclaimant's interest in such prop-
erty and in other property into which such property is converted. A
disclaimer which disclaims some specific rights and retains other
rights with respect to an interest in the property is not a qualified
disclaimer of an undivided portion of the disclaimant's entire inter-
est in property. Thus, for example a disclaimer is not a qualified
disclaimer if the disclaimant disclaims the fee simple in Blackacre,
but retains a life estate.96
Thus, the proposed regulation seems to expressly sanction the dis-
claimer of an undivided one-half interest in a fee.97
Pecuniary Interest Rule
The fourth rule of partial disclaimers, the "pecuniary interest
rule," seems to be a logical interpretation of the term "undivided por-
tion of an interest".98 That rule allows the disclaimer of part of a spe-
cific pecuniary amount. Thus, the disclaimer of $10,000 of a $50,000
bequest will be considered the disclaimer of an undivided portion of an
interest.
The definition of a specific pecuniary amount is not clear. For ex-
ample, the proposed regulations advise us that V, the devisee of the
income from a 500 acre farm, could make a qualified disclaimer of
40% of his income interest in the farm. The example is intended to
illustrate the disclaimer of a part of a specific pecuniary amount.1"0
95. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(1).
96. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(b).
97. Id.
98. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(c).
99. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(c) example 4.
100. This is apparent by the reference in section 25.2518-3(c) to the example.
Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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The application of the pecuniary interest rule appears to be at
odds with the application of the partial interest rule, 01 the trust rule 02
and the undivided portion rule. 0 3 Those rules provide that the dis-
claimer of an income interest for ten years from a life estate would not
be qualified. If an income interest is considered a specific pecuniary
amount, 04 the pecuniary interest rule, which only specifies that "part"
of the specific pecuniary amount must be disclaimed, should be inter-
preted to allow that disclaimer. There does not appear to be a logical
reason for treating the disclaimer of 40% of a life interest as qualified,
while treating the disclaimer of a ten year income interest from a life
estate as not qualified.
E. Nine-Month Rule
Prior to the enactment of section 2518, the regulations provided
that "a refusal to accept ownership does not constitute the making of a
gift if the refusal is made within a reasonable time after knowledge of
the existence of the transfer. 0 5 On its face, this requirement seemed
logical and understandable. However, the reasonable time requirement
became an unworkable standard for determining the federal tax conse-
quences of a disclaimer. 0 6 The primary problem in using such a stan-
dard was the fact it had to be applied on a case by case basis.'0 7 There-
101. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(1)(i).
102. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a).
103. Prop. Reg. § 35.2518-3(a)(2).
104. This result seems to follow proposed regulations section 25.2518-3(D) ex-
ample 4.
105. For a collection of cases illustrating this point, see W. PAGE, PAGE ON THE
LAW OF WILLS 46, 46-47, nn.5-9 (1960). There was both a common law requirement
of reasonable time and a federal law requirement of reasonable time. However, in
many cases, they were treated as a single standard. See Keniath v. Comm'r, 480 F.2d
57, 61 (8th Cir. 1973); Estate of Rolin v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 919, 927 (1977); Estate of
Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 275, 291 (1977), acq. 1978-12 I.R.B. 6 Contra, Jewett v.
Comm'r, 70 T.C. 430, 436 (1978). See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1972).
106. WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, at 66-67.
107. See Estate of Dreyer v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 275 (1977). Therein the court
held: "[w]hat is the reasonable time varies with the circumstances of each case. The
time may be very long if injury to others will not result." Id. at 293 (citing In re Estate
of Mexter, 83 Misc. 2d 290, _, 372 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (N.Y. Country Surr. Ct.
1975)).
263[1LR.C. Section 2518
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fore, prior to the enactment of section 2518, it was nearly impossible to
decide with certainty whether a disclaimer was made within a reasona-
ble time.
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Kenaith v. Commissioner0 8 was
primarily responsible for the enactment of the nine-month rule. In
Kenaith, the disclaimant had a vested remainder subject to divestiture.
The disclaimer was made nineteen years after the creation of the inter-
est but only six months after the death of the life beneficiary. The court
was faced with the difficult question of determining when the period of
reasonable time commences. The Tax Court 09 held that a reasonable
time should be interpreted according to a federal standard,110 and
nineteen years was held not to be a reasonable time. The Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed the Tax Court saying:
In determining 'reasonable time' and the related issue of when the
reasonable time commences, we perforce, absent a federal statute
or regulation defining reasonable time, must look to the law of the
states. We are not conclusively bound by the state law, but this is
the only field to probe for legal decisions and discussions on the
phrase 'reasonable time' as used in the context of making valid
disclaimers."'
After examining many authorities, the court concluded that when
a vested interest subject to divestiture is involved, the reasonable time
period commences after the death of the life beneficiary, not at the
time the interest was created.11 2 The result in Kenaith was a disclaimer
108. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973); WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, supra
note 6, at 66-67.
109. 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
110. The Tax Court relied on Fuller v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 147 (1961) which held
a disclaimer 25 years after the creation of the interest was not within a reasonable
time. These Tax Court decisions create a federal standard, which measures a reasona-
ble time from the creation of the interest whether the interest is a present interest or a
future interest, and whether it is vested or contingent. See Jewett v. Comm'r, 102 S.
Ct. 1082 (1982).
111. 480 F.2d at 61.
112. We hold ... that under the prevailing common law and, in particu-
lar, the jurisdiction of the State of Minnesota the holder of a vested re-
mainder interest subject to divestiture has a reasonable time within which
to renounce or disclaim the remainder interest after the death of the life
22
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made nineteen years after the creation of the interest, but six months
after the death of the life beneficiary, was within a reasonable time. At
that point, it became clear that allowing local law to dictate what a
"reasonable time" was presented an inadequate method of determining
the federal tax consequences of a disclaimer.
Section 2518 eliminated the confusion surrounding the reasonable
time rule by requiring the disclaimer to be made not later than nine
months after the date on which the transfer creating the interest in
such person is made.113 Section 2518, however, does not eliminate the
confusion surrounding the issue of when the transfer creating the inter-
est occurs.
The Supreme Court has recently decided a pre-Section 2518 dis-
claimer case in which the question presented was when did the "trans-
fer" creating the interest occur.21 4 The Court held that the disclaimer
by a trust beneficiary of a contingent interest in a testamentary trust
thirty-three years after the trust was created, but while the interest was
still contingent, was a taxable transfer because the word "transfer" in-
cludes the creation of future interests and contingent remainders.11 5
Thus, the Supreme Court interpreted "transfer" as taxable transfer.
The proposed regulations provide that the nine month period is
determined with reference to each taxable transfer.11 6 A taxable trans-
fer occurs with respect to intervivos transfers when there is a completed
gift for federal gift tax purposes; a taxable transfer occurs with respect
to testamentary transfers upon the date of decedent's death.117 This
definition is in accord with the definition of transfer intended by
Congress."'
If transfer is defined as taxable transfer, it necessarily follows that
beneficiary and that an unequivocal disclaimer filed within six months
thereof is made within a reasonable time.
Id. at 64; contra Jewett, 102 S. Ct. 1082. In Jewett, the court measured the time from
the creation of the interest, rather from the interest became indefeasibly fixed, and
concluded 30 years was not reasonable.
113. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)(A).
114. Jewett, 102 S. Ct. 1082.
115. Id.
116. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(2).
117. Id. See also I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8008078, Nov. 28, 1979.
118. CONFERENCE REPORT ACCOMPANYING H.R.-14844, H.R. REP. No. 94-
1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-24 (1976).
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the disclaimer of certain interests in property will become almost im-
possible. One such interest in property is created by the exercise of a
special power of appointment. Where a donee is given a special power,
the gift (or devise) is a taxable transfer. The donee must disclaim
within nine months from that date in order for the disclaimer to be
"qualified." If the donee chooses not to disclaim and subsequently exer-
cises the power, the appointee's disclaimer must be made within nine
months of the transfer of the power to the donee for it to be qualified.
The nine months do not begin when the power is exercised since the
exercise of a special power is not a taxable transfer.11 9 Consequently,
the "transfer" creating the appointee's interest is the creation of the
power. The harshness of this interpretation is somewhat amelioriated
by the extention of the nine month disclaimer period for disclaimants
less than twenty-one years of age.
In many cases, the donee of the power will refrain from exercising
it for a period in excess of nine months. In such cases, the appointee
will be precluded from making a qualified disclaimer even though as he
is unaware of his interest until it is too late.
In addition to making a qualified disclaimer of some interests im-
possible, Congress' definition of transfer as taxable transfer allows
some "qualified" disclaimers to be made many years after the interest
was created. If we assume that a special power of appointment can
reach the hands of the holder of the power without the occurrence of a
taxable transfer (which can easily happen when the holder acquired it
for full and adequate consideration, for example section 2516), when
will the nine month period begin for the appointee under the special
119. The exercise of a special power of appointment is not a transfer (completed
gift for gift tax purposes). See I.R.C. § 2514 (1954) and Self v. United States, 142 F.
Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1956). The death of B with a special power of appointment is not a
taxable transfer. See I.R.C. § 2041 (1954); Clauson v. Vaughan, 147 F.2d 84 (1st Cir.
1945); James v. Reynolds, 57 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1944). The reason the exercise
of a special power of appointment is not a transfer is because powers of appointment
are not interests in property. The following cases, although prior to I.R.C. § 2041, are
useful to demonstrate that a power of appointment (general or special) is not an inter-
est in property. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942), rev'g 121
F.2d 307, aft'd, 42 BTA 145; United States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921). The exercise
of a general power of appointment is a transfer because of I.R.C. § 2514 and a general
power of appointment is included in a decedent's gross estate because of I.R.C. § 2041
(not I.R.C. § 2033).
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power? It is easier to determine when the nine month period does not
begin. We know it does not begin when the holder acquired the power
since that is not a "transfer." We know it does not begin when the
power is exercised since the exercise of the special power is not a
"transfer." Insofar as no other events occurred, we must conclude that
the period never commenced. Logic tells us that a period which never
commenced can never end. Therefore, in certain situations, the ap-
pointee may have the opportunity to disclaim many years later (assum-
ing he has not accepted the interest or its benefits) and have it qualify.
The result in the above discussion would be vastly different if the
donee is given a general power as opposed to a special power. Since the
exercise of a general power is a taxable transfer, 120 the appointee will
have nine months from the exercise of the power in which to disclaim.
Thus, an appointee under a general power will always have nine
months to disclaim;121 whereas, the appointee under a special power
(especially if it is a testamentary power) will rarely have such an
opportunity.
The obvious question that arises regarding the commencement of
the nine-month period, is whether a disclaimer of property passing by
the exercise of a special power should be treated differently than a dis-
claimer of property passing by the exercise of a general power. If we
focus upon the disclaimant's right to disclaim, there is no justification
for such a distinction. The appointees under both the general and the
special power are similarly situated. They have no way of knowing if
they will be appointed, when they will be appointed or what they will
receive if appointed. In each case, their ownership arises as a result of
the exercise of the power. Therefore, it is of little concern to the ap-
pointee what type of power the holder exercised.
The sole distinction between a general and a special power is with
120. See I.R.C. §§ 2514 & 2041; Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(a)(1) (1958).
121. CONFERENCE REPORT ACCOMPANYING H.R. 14844, H.R. REP. No. 94-
1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 623-24 (1976). The report gives the following example:
[]n the case of a general power of appointment where the other re-
quirements are satisfied, the person who would be the holder of the power
will have a 9 month period after the creation of the power in which to
disclaim and the person to whom the property would pass by reason of the
exercise or lapse of the power would have a 9 month period after a taxable
exercise, etc., by the holder of the power in which to disclaim.
25
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respect to the federal taxation of the holder of the power. The holder of
a general power is taxed upon its exercise; the holder of a special power
is not.122 The imposition of a transfer tax upon the holder of the power
is an inadequate basis to justify disallowing the disclaimer by an ap-
pointee under special power (if made within nine months of the exer-
cise of the power), since the tax is unrelated to the rights of the ap-
pointee. Therefore, it is unreasonable to require the disclaimer made by
an appointee under special power be within nine months of the transfer
creating the power (which may be prior to the exercise of the power),
when an appointee under a general power is permitted to disclaim
within nine months after the exercise of the power. To remedy this
unwarranted distinction, as well as to cure the situation where no trans-
fer occurs, section 2518 should be amended or regulations promulgated
defining transfer in a manner which treats the appointee under a gen-
eral and a special power similarly in all cases. Florida Statutes section
732.801123 provides an excellent example of when an interest must be
disclaimed to assure that the recipient of any interest in property has a
fair opportunity to disclaim:
(5) Time for Filing Disclaimer - A disclaimer shall be recorded
at any time after the creation of the interest, but in any event
within 9 months after the event giving rise to the right to disclaim,
including the death of the decedent; or, if the disclaimant is not
finally ascertained as a beneficiary or his interest has not become
indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity at the death of the
decedent, then the disclaimer shall be recorded not later than 6
months after the event that would cause him to become finally as-
certained and his interest to become indefeasibly fixed both in
quality and in quantity.124
The requirement that the disclaimant not accept any interest in the
disclaimed property provides an adequate safeguard to prevent any
abuse that may arise as a result of allowing additional interests to be
disclaimed.
122. See I.R.C. § 2514 & 2041; Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(a)(1) (1958). The
Generation Skipping Tax rules contained in I.R.C. § 2601-2614 may provide the re-
quired "taxable transfer" in certain situations where special powers are created.
123. FLA. STAT. § 732.801(5) (1977).
124. Id.
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Formula Clauses
It is often impossible to determine whether or not a disclaimer
should be made or the amount of property which should be disclaimed
within nine months from the date the property was transferred. In
large estates, the property may not yet have been valued and there may
be considerable litigation concerning the title to property as well as the
validity of claims filed against the estate. Thus, the disclaimant may be
faced with the dilemma of guessing whether a disclaimer is necessary
or how much property he must disclaim. Section 2518 does not ex-
pressly provide a disclaimant relief from this problem.
In several private letter rulings, the IRS has ruled that a partial
disclaimer will be qualified where the disclaimant uses a formula based
disclaimer.125 For example, a beneficiary's disclaimer of only so much
of the decedent's estate as is needed to cause property equal to the
optimal marital deduction to pass to the surviving spouse will be quali-
fied.12 This is a logical as well as practical interpretation of the
statute.
F. Acceptance of Benefits
Both the common law of disclaimers and Section 2518 provide
that the disclaimant must not accept any of the benefits of the dis-
claimed property for the disclaimer to be qualified. The proposed regu-
lations similarly provide that the disclaimant cannot expressly or "im-
pliedly" accept the benefits of the disclaimed property prior to making
the disclaimer.1 27 If the disclaimant is also a fiduciary, his actions in
such capacity to preserve or maintain the property are not considered
an acceptance of the benefits of the property.1 28 The proposed regula-
tions do not define the term "implied acceptance" other than by the use
of one example. 29 In that example, Blackacre was devised to A. A
never resided in Blackacre, but when the property taxes became due A
125. I.R.C. Letter Rulings 8145036, Aug. 11, 1981; 8130127, April 30, 1981;
7913119, Dec. 19, 1978.
126. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 7913119, Dec. 19, 1978.
127. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1)(i).
128. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1)(ii).
129. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1)(iii) example 3.
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paid them out of his personal funds. A later attempted to disclaim
Blackacre. The example concludes that A's payment of the property
taxes was an "implied acceptance" of Blackacre. That result seems to
be an extremely harsh interpretation of the non-acceptance require-
ment in light of the fact that A was merely intending to preserve the
property. If this example is altered to provide that A, instead of paying
the property taxes, made a monthly mortgage payment on property de-
vised to him subject to a mortgage, presumably the IRS would consider
the mortgage payment an "implied acceptance".
It is doubtful that Congress intended the nine month period for
disclaimers to be shortened where there is a gift or devise of encum-
bered property. In the case of a family residence, the beneficiary or
devisee will be faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to disclaim
the property prior to the first mortgage payment becoming due or to
not make the payment of the mortgage and possibly causing a default
and/or foreclosure.
The IRS in several recent private letter rulings has taken a more
rational position with respect to acceptance of benefits. 180 In letter rul-
ing 8140025, the IRS ruled that the disclaimant's payment of utility
and light bills on property later disclaimed by the executor of the dis-
claimant did not constitute an acceptance of the benefits of the prop-
erty.131 It is difficult to find a conceptual distinction between paying the
property taxes on devised real property and paying the utility and light
bills on such property. Hopefully, the final regulations will be more co-
herent in this respect.
In an example in the proposed regulations, the IRS has taken an
erroneous position with respect to the interaction between the nine
month rule and the acceptance of benefits rule.13 2 In that example, ten
shares of stock were given to H under the State X uniform gift to mi-
nors act. Majority in state X is eighteen. At the time of the gift, H was
fifteen years old. Upon attainment of the age of eighteen, the ten
shares were delivered and registered in H's name. H, within nine
months of attaining the age of twenty-one, disclaimed the ten shares.
130. I.R.S. Letter Rulings 8140025, July 7, 1981; 7909055, Nov. 29, 1978;
7922018, Feb. 28, 1979.
131. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8140025, July 7, 1981.
132. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1)(iii) example 7.
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The example concludes that H's disclaimer is not qualified because H
received fee ownership of the shares on his eighteenth birthday but
failed to disclaim the shares within nine months thereafter. Interest-
ingly, the Regulaton did not cite H's acceptance of the benefits of the
property as its basis for concluding the disclaimer was not qualified.
The conclusion in this example is clearly wrong if it is based on the fact
that H's disclaimer was not qualified solely because it was not made
within nine months of H's eighteenth birthday. Section 2518(b)(2)(B)
clearly provides that H had nine months after the day on which he
attained the age of twenty-one in which to disclaim.
It appears to be the IRS's position that the receipt of trust income
by a beneficiary does not preclude the beneficiary from disclaiming his
interest in corpus.13 3 The proposed regulation illustrates this point in
the following example. The current income beneficiary of a trust, B, is
to receive one-half the corpus upon attainment of the age of forty. B
received one income distribution and then attempted to disclaim his
interest in the income and corpus of the trust. The example concludes
that B's disclaimer of the income is not qualified insofar as he has ac-
cepted income prior to making the disclaimer. However, B's disclaimer
of the corpus is qualified. Even though the "partial disclaimer rule"
treats B's interest in income and corpus as two separate interests, the
IRS is quite liberal in its interpretation that B has not accepted the
benefits of the corpus in this example.
G. Use of Disclaimers as a Method of Achieving Tax Savings
Charitable Remainders
It is not uncommon for individuals to make charitable dispositions
of their property upon their death. One popular form of charitable
transfer is the creation of a trust, inter vivos or testementary, with the
corpus passing to a charity upon the occurence of a stated event or the
expiration of a stated number of years.'" To be deductible for estate
tax purposes, the transfer of a remainder interest in trust property must
qualify as a charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remain-
133. Prop. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1)(iii) example 1.
134. See I.R.C. § 2055 (1955).
7:1983
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der unitrust.13 5 There are numerous highly technical requirements
which must be satisfied for a trust to fall into these categories. 13 If for
any reason a trust fails to satisfy the requirements, the estate tax de-
duction will be lost. 37 Therefore, extreme care must be exercised to
avoid the slightest transgression of the charitable transfer rules.
If a decedent makes a transfer of a remainder interest to a charity
which is not in the required form, it is still possible to salvage a chari-
table deduction for the decedent's estate. Assume that D dies with an
estate of $100,000,000 and his will creates a trust with a corpus of
$50,000,000 for the benefit of his son, S, for life, remainder to Nova
Law Center. Under the terms of the trust, S is guaranteed an annual
distribution of $2,000,000 and the trustee has the power to invade
corpus for the benefit of S. The trust is not a charitable remainder
annuity trust or unitrust because S does not have the right to receive at
least 5% of the initial corpus annually and an amount other than the
payment of a sum certain (or fixed percentage) of corpus may be paid
to S.138 Therefore, D's estate will not be entitled to a charitable
deduction.
If S disclaims each of his interests in the trust, the transfer will be
deemed to have been made directly from D to Nova Law Center 39
which entitle D (or his estate) to a charitable deduction. Therefore, S's
disclaimer of his interest in the trust will salvage the charitable deduc-
tion for D's estate.1 40
Marital Deduction and Unified Credit
A 1978 amendment to section 2518 made it possible for property
to pass to a decedent's spouse as a result of a disclaimer even if the
135. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2)(A) (1974).
136. See I.R.C. § 664(d)(1)(2) (1954).
137. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2).
138. I.R.C. § 664(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B).
139. Letter Ruling 8031018, March 21, 1980. See also Rev. Rul. 78-152, 1978-2
C.B. 296.
140. Rev. Rul. 78-152, 1978-2 C.B. 296. In Letter Ruling 8031018, March 21,
1980, the IRS ruled that as a result of a beneficiary's disclaimer, his income interest
never arose, thus, the charity was considered as having received its interest in the estate
immediately.
1272 Nova Law Journal
7:1983
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss2/2
1RC 7ec:o198327
7:1983
surviving spouse was the disclaimant .14 This amendment is important
because it allows a surviving spouse to disclaim an interest in a marital
trust and take the property under a non-marital trust assuming the de-
cedent's will is set up properly.142 A spouse will only make such a dis-
claimer when the marital bequest exceeds the "optimal" marital deduc-
tion.1 43 One common situation where the marital bequest exceeds the
optimal marital deduction occurs where the decedent's will fails to take
the unified credit into consideration when funding the marital trust.
The estate of every decedent who was a citizen or resident of the
United States at the time of death is entitled to a credit against his
estate tax.144 In 1982, the credit is $62,800.145 The $62,800 credit
means that a taxable estate of $225,000 or less will not have to pay any
estate tax.
Sound estate planning dictates that the decedent's taxable estate
not be less than the amount of the credit against estate tax available to
the decedent.146 The concept is illustrated by the following example. D
dies with a gross estate of $450,000. His wife, W, has no separate prop-
erty. D wishes to avoid all estate tax upon his and W's death. D's will
provides:
If my spouse survives me, I give to my trustee, hereinafter named,
141. Tax Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(M), 92 Stat. 2934
(1978), amended I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4).
142. The decedent's will must contain a marital bequest (one which qualifies for
the marital deduction) and a non-marital bequest (one which does not qualify for the
marital deduction and does not cause the property to be included in the spouse's gross
estate), with the decedent's spouse named as the beneficiary under each trust. The non-
marital trust should be drafted in manner so as to give the spouse all the incidents of
ownership consistent with its exclusion from the spouse's gross estate. In addition, it is
advisable to include in the decedent's will a clause which provides that any property
disclaimed shall pass to the non-marital trust.
143. The optimal marital deduction is not necessarily the maximum marital de-
duction allowable because consideration must be made for items such as the unified
credit and other deductions available to the estate.
144. I.R.C. § 2010 (1976).
145. I.R.C. § 2010(b) (1976).
146. If the taxable estate is less than the credit, the excess of the credit over the
decedent's estate tax liability will be wasted. The credit is also used to reduce the tax
payable on certain gifts made during the decedent's lifetime, thus, the entire credit
may not be available at the decedent's death.
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a pecuniary amount equal to the maximum marital deduction al-
lowable to my estate for federal estate tax purposes, less the aggre-
gate amount of marital deductions, if any, allowed for interests in
property passing or which have passed to my spouse otherwise than
by the terms of this article.
Since ERTA 1981, the maximum marital deduction is 100% of
D's gross estate. 1 7 Therefore, the provision of D's will transfers D's
entire estate-$450,000-to a marital trust created for W. Since D's
estate will be entitled to a marital deduction of $450,000, D's taxable
estate will be zero and no estate tax will be payable on D's death. W
will have a taxable estate of $450,000 because the corpus of the marital
trust will be included in her estate upon her death. 8 If W also dies in
1982, her estate will be taxed on $450,000, yielding a tax of $138,800,
and her estate will be entitled to a credit of $62,800.
If D's will provided that the marital bequest was to be reduced to
take into consideration the value of the credit available to D with the
remainder of D's estate used to fund a non-marital trust for the benefit
of W, D's estate tax would remain zero and there would be no tax
payable on W's death because W's taxable estate would be limited to
$225,000 and the credit available to W's estate, $62,800, would reduce
the tax to zero.149 Thus, no estate tax would be payable on the death of
D and W, an estate tax savings of $76,000 over the situation above.
In those situations where a decedent's will does not allow for the
reduction of the marital bequest by the amount of credit available to
the decedent's estate, the situation can be corrected by having the dece-
dent's spouse disclaim the portion of the marital bequest which is nec-
essary to allow the decedent to make full use of his credit. In the situa-
tion posed above, W would disclaim $225,000.
The benefits to be derived by such a disclaimer are the securing of
the optimal marital deduction and the exclusion of the disclaimed prop-
erty from the disclaimant's gross estate. In theory such a disclaimer is
147. ERTA 1981.
148. I.R.C. § 2056 (1954) (amended by 1981 ERTA). I assume that the marital
trust was a qualified terminable interest trust.
149. See I.R.C. §§ 2033-2042 (1976). The non-marital portion ($225,000) would
not be included in W's estate because she would not have an interest in property of a
character which is includible in her estate.
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an effective post mortem estate planning device, but before a spouse
makes such a disclaimer, he or she will have to be convinced that it is a
beneficial course of action. The proposed regulations inhibit the ability
of a surviving spouse to disclaim in this circumstance by providing that
"[i]f the surviving spouse. . . retains the right to direct the beneficial
enjoyment of the disclaimed property in a transfer that is not subject to
Federal estate and gift tax, such spouse will be treated as directing the
beneficial enjoyment of the disclaimed property. 150 The proposed regu-
lation should be revised to provide that the typical powers given to a
surviving spouse as part of a non-marital trust should not taint an oth-
erwise qualified disclaimer.
Special Use Valuation
Generally, the property included in a decedent's gross estate is val-
ued at its fair market value at the date of the decedent's death.151 If
certain conditions are satisfied, real property included in a decedent's
estate will be valued on the basis of its current use rather than its fair
market value.15 2 To be eligible for the special valuation, the real prop-
erty must be used for farming or other closely held business purposes
and must pass to a qualified heir. 53 A qualified heir includes an ances-
tor or lineal descendant of the decedent and the decedent's spouse or
parent.'5 The IRS has ruled that a devise of real property not satisfy-
ing the requirements for special use valuation may be effected by the
use of a disclaimer. 155 In that ruling, a farm was bequeathed to A, a
150. If the marital trust is a qualified terminable interest trust, the property in-
terests the spouse receives in the non-marital trust are extremely similar to the property
interests that spouse had in the marital trust. The spouse can receive, under a non-
martial trust, the following: a life estate, a special power of appointment, a five and five
general power of appointment, a general power of appointment subject to an ascertain-
able standard, and the trustee can be given the power to invade the corpus for the
spouse's comfort or maintenance. But see proposed regulations section 25.2518-2(e)(2)
which requires the surviving spouse to give up certain of the powers that the spouse
could otherwise enjoy as part of the non-marital trust.
151. See I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1954).
152. I.R.C. § 2032A (1976).
153. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(2) (1976).
154. Id.
155. Rev. Rul. 82-140, 1982-29 I.R.B. 9.
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qualifying heir, and A was given a testamentary special power of ap-
pointment. The class of permissible appointees available to A included
non-qualifying heirs. Since A had the power to appoint the property to
non-qualifying heirs, the property did not qualify for special use valua-
tion.15 6 The IRS ruled that the disclaimer by A of his special power of
appointment made it possible for the property to be specially valued
because, as a result of the disclaimer, the remainder vested in a quali-
fied heir. 157
IV. Conclusion
This article has attempted to trace the law of disclaimers from the
date of enactment of section 2518 in 1976, to the present. In the six
year period beginning with the enactment of section 2518, the IRS has
not issued final regulations. Moreover, the IRS has interpreted section
2518 in a manner that caused Congress to amend that section in 1981
to carry out the expressed purpose of the 1976 legislation.
On July 22, 1980, the IRS published proposed regulations inter-
preting section 2518. Those regulations contain many definitional flaws
and examples which at best are misleading. The treatment of the dis-
claimer of jointly held property in the proposed regulations clearly im-
pose rules not contained in the statute and effectively prohibits the dis-
claimer of most interests in jointly held property. The IRS has created
numerous vague and arbitrary tests for determining whether partial
disclaimers are valid. One major shortcoming with the IRS approach is
reliance upon state law to determine whether a partial disclaimer is
qualified.
It is distressing that the IRS has yet to issue final regulations, and
has continued, in one way or another, to impose the peculiarities of
state law upon section 2518. Hopefully, the IRS will carefully review
the proposed regulations and rethink its position.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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